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Abstract 
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative 
assumptions: that people perceive wealth changes as absolute amounts of money; and that 
people consider wealth changes as a proportion of some reference value dependant on the 
context of the problem under consideration. The former assumption leads to the design of 
Prospect Theory, the latter - to a solution closely resembling the utility function hypothesized 
by Markowitz (1952). This paper presents several crucial arguments for the latter approach 
and provides strong arguments for rejecting the Prospect Theory paradigm. 
 
JEL Classification: C91, D03, D81, D87.  
 
Keywords: Prospect / Cumulative Prospect Theory, Probability Weighting Function, Marko-
witz Hypothesis, Weber’s Law.  
 
1. Introduction 
 Prospect Theory (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979), and its Cumulative version (Tversky, 
Kahneman, 1992) assert that people are more concerned with changes in wealth than its over-
all value when making decisions involving small sums of money. Anticipated gains and loss-
es, expressed as monetary amounts, are then used to evaluate the prospects under considera-
tion. An analysis of lottery experiments assuming the absolute notion of wealth changes re-
quires, however, the concept of probability weighting to be incorporated into the descriptive 
model. 
The present paper questions the assumption that people treat gains and losses as abso-
lute values when making decisions under conditions of risk. On the contrary, it asserts that 
gains and losses are perceived in relative terms, in a context which depends on how attention 
is focused on it. The result is that gains and losses are perceived in relation to a reference val-
ue which, most frequently, is the maximum prospect outcome. Analyzing gains and losses in 
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relative terms eliminates the need for the probability distortion concept and leads to a solution 
closely resembling the utility function hypothesized by Markowitz (1952).  
This paper presents several important arguments in support of the latter approach, the 
major one being that people regard changes in wealth in relative terms is founded on Weber’s 
Law - one of the fundamental laws of psychophysics. This law contradicts the absolute notion 
of wealth changes. The observation is not new and has been confirmed by modern researchers 
including Kahneman, Tversky (1984) and Thaler (1985, 1999) since the introduction of Pros-
pect Theory.  
 
2.  Absolute Notion of Wealth Changes 
2.1. Consider the following set of experiments3: 
Experiment 1: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 50% chance of winning ei-
ther $100 or $0, or to receive a payment of $50? Most respondents would prefer to receive 
the certain payment. 
Experiment 2: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 50% chance of winning ei-
ther $200 or $0, or to receive a payment of $100? Most respondents would prefer the certain 
payment. 
Experiment 3: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 50% chance of winning ei-
ther $400 or $0, or to receive a payment of $200? Most respondents would prefer the certain 
payment. 
Analogous experiments can be repeated for other monetary amounts in order to “scan” 
a hypothetical utility function over a broad range of outcomes. Because the responses invaria-
bly indicate a preference for certain payments, researchers conclude that people are averse to 
risk. This is why their utility curve is assumed to be concave whatever the outcome under 
consideration. 
 2.2. Consider the following further set of experiments: 
Experiment 4: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of winning $500 
and $0 otherwise, or to receive a payment of $50? Most respondents would prefer the lottery. 
Experiment 5: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of winning 
$1000 and $0 otherwise, or to receive a payment of $100? Most respondents would prefer the 
lottery. 
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Experiment 6: Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of winning 
$2000 and $0 otherwise, or to receive a payment of $200? Most respondents would prefer the 
lottery. 
The respondents in these cases exhibit risk seeking behavior and, interestingly, for the 
same certain payment amounts ($50, $100, and $200) as in Experiments 1 - 3. Researchers 
conclude that people are generally risk averse (as demonstrated in Experiments 1 - 3) in these 
situations as well, but that there has to exist an additional effect related to the perception of 
probabilities in order to explain the risk-seeking behavior observed in Experiments 4 - 6. This 
effect would have to rely on a non-linear perception of probabilities and especially on an 
overweighting of low ones. This reasoning thus leads to a theory in which there exists a non-
linear probability weighting function in addition to a utility function. This is how Prospect 
Theory (and other theories using a similar approach) developed. 
2.3. There is no reason why these experiments could not have been conducted in the 
reverse order to arrive at the very opposite conclusions. Researchers could well have con-
cluded that people are generally risk-seeking on the strength of Experiments 4 - 6 and argued 
that their utility function should be convex over the entire range of outcomes under considera-
tion. The risk-aversion observed in Experiments 1 – 3 would again find its explanation in a 
non-linear probability weighting, only this time the low probabilities would be perceived ac-
curately whereas probabilities around 0.5 would be heavily underweighted.  
2.4. Both explanations presented utilize the probability weighting function additionally 
to the utility function. Both explanations would have the same ability to describe the experi-
mental results, albeit with completely different modi operandi. The fact that changing the se-
quence of reasoning steps changes the resulting explanation might be a signal that this ap-
proach is unsound. 
3. Relative Notion of Wealth Changes 
3.1. The foregoing reasoning assumed the absolute notion of wealth changes. This 
means that gains and losses were represented and analyzed as monetary amounts (such as $50, 
$100, or $200). This is one of the basic assumptions of Prospect Theory and is best expressed 
by a value function which supposedly determines the value (utility) of specific amounts of 
money to people (according to Cumulative Prospect Theory the value function is defined as 
( ) αλ xxv = , where x is the gain or loss expressed as an absolute monetary amount). 
People, however, typically consider wealth changes in relative terms. This means that 
gains and losses are usually perceived as a proportion of a reference value, which depends on 
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the context of the problem. This observation is not new and was also noticed by Kahneman 
and Tversky in 1984, i.e. 5 years after the introduction of Prospect Theory: The topical or-
ganization of mental accounts leads people to evaluate gains and losses in relative rather 
than in absolute terms (emphasis added)4. Despite this, the absolute notion of gains and losses 
remained the underlying assumption of Cumulative Prospect Theory, which appeared in 1992.  
3.2. The explanation that people regard changes of wealth in relative terms is founded 
on basic psychophysical laws. In the first half of the nineteenth century, German researcher 
Ernst Weber conducted experiments on determining the Just Noticeable Difference in weight 
between objects and concluded that this difference is twice as great with a 2 kg object than 
with a 1 kg object. The law Weber formulated in 1834 states that this difference is a constant 
proportion of the initial stimulus magnitude. This is now one of the fundamental laws of psy-
chophysics (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2009): 
 JND/ S = k        
where JND denotes the Just Noticeable Difference, S denotes the initial stimulus magnitude 
and k is a constant. This law holds with reasonable accuracy for most stimuli within a broad 
range. For example, the value of k is 2% for weight, 4.8% for loudness and 7.9% for bright-
ness. It follows from the Weber law that the same change in stimulus (for instance 0.2 kg) can 
be strongly felt, slightly noticed or not perceived at all depending on the magnitude of the 
initial stimulus. It further follows that an unambiguous and absolute perception level of a spe-
cific stimulus change cannot be determined, as this depends on the situational context. 
 3.3. How the Weber Law works for financial stimuli will be presented with the follow-
ing example: 
 Problem 1a: What is the smallest significant amount of money to a person shopping for 
goods worth about $100? 
This will possibly be close to 1 dollar (but not as small as 1 cent). Such a person may, 
for example, consider choosing a rival product that is $0.5 cheaper. 
Problem 1b: What is the smallest amount of money considered by the same person 
purchasing a house for $500,000? 
This will probably be at least $1,000. A purchase offer of $479,538 is hard to imagine; 
$480,000 seems far more likely. It follows that ten dollars, a significant amount in the former 
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case, is completely insignificant in the latter. Even $100, the sum total of a person’s expendi-
ture in a shop, is of no significance in a house purchase.  
3.4. The foregoing example demonstrates that the human mental system adapts itself 
to financial quantities, just as its sensory system does to physical ones. The result is that the 
Just Noticeable Difference remains an approximately constant proportion of different finan-
cial amounts. This means that when considering financial prospects (projects, investments, 
lotteries etc.), the size of the prospect becomes a reference value in the entire mental process, 
rendering an absolute amount of money (say $10) relevant or irrelevant depending on the con-
text. This conclusion constitutes a fundamental deviation from Prospect Theory, which re-
gards gains and losses in absolute terms, and attempts to derive a value function in terms of 
absolute monetary amounts. 
 
4.  Solution Resulting From Relative Notion of Wealth Changes 
4.1. In point 2, we demonstrated how the consideration of gains and losses in absolute 
terms inevitably leads to the concept of probability weighting. We will now show that consid-
ering gains and losses as relative values allows the experimental results to be explained with-
out this concept.  
 4.2. The results of the Experiments 1-6 can be explained differently by assuming that 
people perceive outcomes as proportions of the main payment. No “scanning” of the utility 
function is performed for the various outcomes in Experiments 1 - 3 because the amount of 
the certain payment is always half that of the main payment. All three questions therefore deal 
with the value of the utility function for the relative outcome of r = 0.5. The conclusion from 
these three experiments is that people are risk-averse for this particular relative outcome, so 
the utility function is concave at this point. But this conclusion only concerns this one point. 
Repeating similar experiments with p = 0.5 for different outcome values would still only in-
form us about this single point of the curve expressed in terms of relative outcomes. 
 Similarly, Experiments 4 - 6 show that people exhibit a risk-seeking attitude by their 
preference for the lottery over a relative outcome of r = 0.1. The utility function is therefore 
convex at this point. Once again, this conclusion is only valid for this single point. This line of 
reasoning leads to the plotting of a utility function expressed for relative outcome values, 
which is partially convex and partially concave. This would certainly be a completely differ-
ent solution from that proposed by Prospect Theory, all the more so since it would not utilize 
any probability weighting function.  
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4.3. The foregoing reasoning may be repeated for losses as well. Consider the follow-
ing set of 3 experiments (the outcomes in parentheses correspond with the respective experi-
ment numbers): 
Experiment 7 (8, 9): Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 90% chance of losing 
$100 ($200, $400) and $0 otherwise, or to pay $90 ($180, $360) to avoid the game? Most 
respondents would prefer the lottery. 
Consider now the following further set of 3 experiments: 
Experiment 10 (11, 12): Would you prefer to enter a lottery with a 10% chance of los-
ing $900 ($1800, $3600) and $0 otherwise, or to pay $90 ($180, $360) to avoid the game? 
Most respondents would prefer to pay the certain amount. 
The respondents in Experiments 7 – 9 exhibit risk seeking behavior, whereas the re-
spondents in Experiments 10 - 12 exhibit risk aversion behavior for exactly the same certain 
payment amounts ($90, $180, and $360). As in case of gains, considering losses in absolute 
terms requires a probability weighting function to be incorporated into the descriptive model. 
Similarly, the order of the reasoning steps influences the conclusion regarding the general 
attitude to risk. Beginning with Experiments 7 - 9 leads to the conclusion that people are gen-
erally risk seeking and that a probability weighting function is required to explain the risk 
aversion observed in Experiments 10 - 12. Conversely, beginning with Experiments 10 - 12 
leads to the conclusion that people are generally risk averse and that a probability weighting 
function is required to explain the risk seeking attitude observed in Experiments 7 - 9.  
Once again, it follows that completely different modi operandi result from both ap-
proaches with the value and probability weighting functions assuming different shapes in each 
case.  
4.4. Analyzing the experimental results using the relative notion of losses leads to a 
completely different and unambiguous result. Experiments 7 - 9 lead to the conclusion that 
people are risk seeking for the relative loss of r = 0.9, whereas Experiments 10 - 12 lead to 
the conclusion that people are risk averse for the relative loss of r = 0.1. No probability 
weighting function is required to explain the results of these experiments. 
 
5. Relative Utility Function 
5.1. The shape of the utility function, expressed in terms of relative outcomes, can 
now be hypothesized using the results presented in Point 4. The solution is presented in Fig.1.  
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Fig. 1.  The relative utility function. 
 
The curve should be concave for high relative gains, reflecting the risk aversion ob-
served in Experiments 1-3, and convex for low relative gains, reflecting the risk seeking atti-
tude observed in Experiments 4-6.  
The picture is reversed for losses. The function should be convex for high relative 
losses, reflecting the risk seeking attitude observed in Experiments 7 - 9, and concave for low 
relative losses, reflecting the risk aversion observed in Experiments 10 – 12.  
The double-S shape of this hypothetical relative utility function offers a simple and 
concise explanation of risk-seeking and risk-aversion attitudes when making decisions under 
conditions of risk. This replaces the “fourfold pattern” of risk attitude formulated by Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory. This solution is unambiguous and does not require a probability weight-
ing function to describe the pattern. The curve should be of greater magnitude for losses than 
for gains as people are generally averse to loss. 
5.2. Quite surprisingly, the obtained curve strongly resembles the utility function hy-
pothesized by Markowitz (1952) and shown in Figure 2.  
 
Fig. 2. The shape of the utility function according to the Markowitz hypothesis of 1952. 
 
The only significant difference with the Markowitz curve is that the relative utility 
function is defined for relative values of outcomes rather than for absolute ones.   
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6. Summary. 
This paper discusses solutions derived from lottery experiments using two alternative 
assumptions: the absolute and relative notion of wealth changes. Several important advan-
tages of the latter approach have been presented in the paper. Most importantly, people do 
consider changes of wealth in relative terms. This was even confirmed by Kahneman and 
Tversky – the authors of Prospect Theory.  
However, introducing this assumption into an analysis of the experimental data leads 
to the rejection of Prospect Theory itself. The concept of probability weighting – one of the 
key planks of Prospect Theory – becomes unnecessary when gains and losses are considered 
in relative terms.  
The relative notion of wealth changes leads to a completely different solution, one 
which strongly resembles the utility function hypothesized by Markowitz (1952).  
This paper strictly demarcates the two approaches as the relative and absolute notions 
are mutually exclusive. As a result Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1992) can-
not be held to be an accurate explanation of people’s behavior while gains and losses are si-
multaneously held to be perceived in relative terms (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  
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